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Power Source Drivers and Performance Outcomes of Functional and Dysfunctional 




Although conflict is natural in buyer–seller relations, the issue has largely been studied in 
domestic market settings despite increasing globalization and the surge of cross-border inter-
firm relationships. This research focuses on two different types of conflict, functional and 
dysfunctional, and examines how these are linked to coercive and non-coercive power bases 
and performance outcomes in exporter–importer relationships. Using survey data from 105 
pairs of exporters and their foreign distributors, we find that only in the exporter group the 
use of coercive power by the foreign distributor lowers functional conflict. However, the use 
of coercive power by the overseas partner increases dysfunctional conflict and the use of non-
coercive power reduces such conflict across both exporters and importers, although in the 
importer group this link is not significant. The results also suggest that functional conflict 
enhances performance only among importers. The use of problem solving conflict resolution 
boosts functional conflict’s impact on performance among exporters, but adversely affects the 
performance effect of such conflict in the importer group. Nonetheless, problem solving 
resolution negatively affects the impact of dysfunctional conflict on performance in both the 
exporter and importer groups. Moreover, we find that power distance boosts the impact of 
dysfunctional conflict on performance in the relationship across the groups of exporters and 
importers. Implications of the findings for international marketing theory and practice are 
discussed, and limitations of the study considered along with future research directions. 
 
Keywords: power sources, functional and dysfunctional conflict, conflict resolution, power 




Over the past three decades there has been a surge in the frequency and scale of inter-
organizational exchange relationships at both domestic and international levels.  This has 
resulted in significant research interest in the study of behavioral aspects underpinning the 
establishment, development, and management of inter-firm cooperative arrangements.  
Within the wide range of rich research streams that have been pursued, conflict has been 
recognized in the marketing channels literature as an integral element of relationships 
between organizational customers and their suppliers (e.g., Van der Maelen, Breugeimans, & 
Cleeren, 2017; Hoppner, Griffith, & White, 2015).  The presence of conflict in inter-firm 
relationships is rooted in the interdependence that inherently exists between the exchange 
partners, which is based on the fact that each side specializes in accomplishing certain tasks 
in the relationship (e.g., Gaski, 1984; Palmatier, Stern, El-Ansary, & Anderson, 2013). There 
is no doubt that understanding the phenomenon of conflict in buyer–seller business 
exchanges can lead to long-lasting close collaborative partnerships. 
Notwithstanding the considerable managerial interest and research attention to the 
issue of conflict in business relationships, a systematic review of the literature identifies 
certain important issues that warrant consideration.  First, the bulk of extant research has 
largely viewed conflict between buyers and their suppliers as harmful and unconstructive 
behaviors that mark weak business associations (e.g., Gaski, 1984; Frazier, 1999).  However, 
it has been proposed that conflict can not only have negative, destructive elements in 
relational exchanges, but can also produce positive, constructive outcomes in buyer–seller 
interactions (e.g., Bucklin & Sengupta, 1993; Menon, Bharadwaj, & Howell, 1996).  
Compared to the substantial amount of empirical study on conflict’s destructive outcomes, 
relatively limited research is conducted on its constructive elements and implications for the 
relationship (e.g., Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar, 1999; Skarmeas, 2006).  Even more 
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important is that there is a dearth of research on work that simultaneously considers the 
different roles and effects of these diverse conflictual behaviors in business associations, 
limiting our understanding of the whole picture of conflict in buyer–s ller interactions. 
Examination of both types of conflictual attitudes and behaviors would enable a holistic 
understanding of this important phenomenon in inter-firm relations regarding drivers of its 
functionality and dysfunctionality and how the two are linked to performance outcomes.  
Second, empirical studies on the link between conflict and qualitative outcomes and 
performance across different types of relationships have produced discordant findings.  While 
some research efforts indicate that conflict reduces beneficial relationship outcomes and 
performance (e.g., Anderson & Narus, 1990; Brown, Lusch, & Smith, 1991; Leonidou, 
Samiee, Aykol, & Talias 2014), several other studies report no significant link (e.g., Bobot, 
2011; Passos & Caetano, 2005), and still other efforts find that conflict has positive effects 
(e.g., Cooper & Watson, 2011; Skarmeas, 2006). These mixed results indicate that th
connection between conflict and performance outcomes in the relationship is ambiguous and 
complex and that conflict’s effects on performance may not be the same under all 
circumstances (cf. Menguc, Auh, Katsikeas, & Jung, 2016). This is an important limi ting 
consideration in current work that requires attention, as it inhibits the development of 
coherent cumulative knowledge in the extant literature.   
Third, the majority of studies on buyer–seller relationships, in general, and conflict, in 
particular, have been undertaken within the context of the domestic market.  The issue of 
conflict has received limited empirical attention in cross-border exchange relationship 
settings.  Even more important is the fact that the vast majority of studies on international 
business relationships are conducted either from the standpoint of the seller (e.g., Hoppner et 
al. 2015; Griffith & Zhao, 2015) or from the perspective of the purchasing organization (e.g., 
Katsikeas, Skarmeas, & Bello, 2009; Skarmeas, 2006).  Scant empirical attention has been 
5 
 
devoted to the study of both the buyer and the seller, which constitute two active components 
in the international exchange partnership. This is an important gap in the literature as cross-
border inter-firm exchange phenomena have commonly been studied only on the basis of 
attitudes and perceptions of the one side in the relationship, w ile the counterpart’s position 
and standpoint in the trading association are essentially ignored. 
In view of these limiting considerations in the pertinent literature, the primary purpose 
of this study is to examine the issue of conflict in cross-border business associations. More 
specifically, this research focuses on the presence of conflict in exporter–impo ter 
relationships and investigates its power source-related drivers and performance outcomes. In 
contrast to relationships in the domestic market, international business associations are 
influenced by the different operating environments of the exchange partners typically 
characterized by differences in economic, political, regulatory, and socio-cultural factors, 
competitive forces, business practices, market characteristics, and customer behavior between 
home and host markets (e.g., Durand, Turkina, & Robson, 2016; Leonidou, Aykol, Fotiadis, 
& Christodoulides, 2017). Therefore, building and managing business relationships with 
trading partners in foreign markets is a more challenging task than buyer–sell  relationships 
in the domestic market and, in turn, makes the study of drivers and performance outcomes of 
conflict in a cross-border dyadic context a particularly interesting issue for investigation.  
This study contributes to the pertinent literature in various important ways.  First, we 
pursue the distinction between functional conflict and dysfunctional conflict and consider 
how these two different types of conflict are connected with performance outcomes in the 
relationship.1  We recognize that, in addition to the unhelpful, destructive elements associated 
                                                          
1Consistent with inter-firm exchange research (e.g., Bello, Katsikeas, & Robson, 2010; Palmatier, Dant, Grewal, 
& Evans, 2006), we focus on each firm’s performance through the relationship with the foreign partner. 
Exporters and importers naturally use different frames of reference when ass ssing their own performance. 
While both partners desire a successful relationship, success can differ between the two because they might be 
aspiring to achieve different outcomes. Exporters may well assess their performance achieved through a foreign 
distributor relationship on the basis of that relationship’s contributions to the exporter’s own sales and financial 
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with conflictual attitudes and behaviors, disagreements between the parties may also have 
positive, constructive ingredients that can strengthen the quality of interactions and the 
overall relationship.  In this way, we integrate the literature on conflict and suggest that these 
two different types of conflict can co-exist even though that they are likely to yield different 
performance outcomes.  Further, work on distribution channels has paid attention to 
examining how different types of power sources are related to conflict (e.g., Gaski and Nevin, 
1985; Rawwas, Vitell, & Barnes, 1997; Zhuang, Xi, & Tang, 2010).  We extend this 
examination by considering relationships of coercive power and non-coercive power bases 
with functional and dysfunctional conflict in cross-border exchanges. 
Second, we consider conditions under which the strength and direction of the 
relationships of functional conflict and dysfunctional conflict with performance outcomes 
vary. We draw from the literature on conflict resolution and examine the relevance of 
problem solving conflict resolution, which is a distinct mechanism that companies often 
employ in dealing with disagreements and conflict situations, in potentially moderating the 
links between functional conflict and dysfunctional conflict and performance in the 
relationship. Furthermore, based on prior research on the role of national culture (e.g., 
Hofstede, 2001), we consider the importance of power distance in the firm’s operating 
environment in influencing these conflict–performance links. We contribute to the literature 
by indicating that problem solving conflict resolution plays a different role across the two 
distinct types of conflict and across the exporter and importer groups, as well as that power 
distance conditions the dysfunctional conflict–performance link, which might help reconcile 
discordant findings in prior studies. 
Finally, this empirical study investigates the phenomenon of conflict in cross-border 
exchange partnerships by considering both sides of the relationship.  It adds to the body of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
outcomes from the specific foreign market. In contrast, importers might assess performance in their local market 
based not only on maximizing sales and profits for the imports from a specific foreign supplier, but also on the 
contribution of these imports to their product portfolio and overall sales.  
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research in international inter-firm collaboration that typically examines behavioral aspects 
underpinning business relationships either from the perspective of the supplier or less often 
from the standpoint of the purchasing side.  In this research, we adopt a dyadic approach to 
examining drivers and performance outcomes of functional conflict and dysfunctional 
conflict by focusing on pairs of relationships between exporters and importers. Despite 
heightened difficulties in collecting paired data in the context of international exchange, this 
approach enables us to overcome concerns with one-sided studies of inter-firm relations and 
broaden our understanding of the complexities involved in international buyer–sell  
interactions, which reflect an inherently dyadic business phenomenon (e.g., Johnson, Cullen, 
Sakano, & Takenouchi, 1996). 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1 The issue of conflict in buyer–seller relationships 
There are two broad schools of thought that can be identified in the conflict literature: 
one school concerns the traditional viewpoint where conflict is viewed as bad for the 
relationship, while another school represents the more recent interactionist perspective that 
views conflict as energizing for a company that  has strengthening and unifying elements for 
a group (Banner, 1995). Neither the occurrence nor the outcomes of conflict are solely and 
completely determined by objective circumstances, but the psychological processes of 
perceiving and valuing turn such a phenomenon into the experience of conflict (Deutsch, 
1969). Much of the traditional research has developed various views of conflict including 
task vs. emotional, cognitive vs. relationship, or substantive vs. affective conflict. Substantive 
conflict, also labeled as task (e.g. Jehn, 1994; Rose & Shoham, 2004), issue (e.g. Rahim, 
2011), or cognitive (e.g. Amason, 1996; Ohbuchi & Suzuki, 2003) conflict, originates from 
differences in opinions regarding tasks, procedures, strategy, business ideas, and other 
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business-related issues. Resolving such conflict involves evaluation of opinion and ideas 
based on logic and evidence, as well as critical and innovative thinking. Affective conflict, 
also labeled as emotional (e.g. Rose, Shoham, Neill & Ruvio, 2007), relationship (e.g. Jehn, 
1997), psychological (e.g. Rahim, 2011), or interpersonal (e.g. Ohbuchi & Suzuki, 2003) 
conflict, is caused by incompatibility in emotions and feelings regarding issues of interest 
between two social entities. Actions taken by one or both parties usually include personal 
attacks, personality clashes, sarcasm, criticism, and making fun of the other side’s ideas, 
leading to distrust, anger, frustration and hostility in the relationship. 
When there are emotions of anger, anxiety, hostility, frustration or tension, the 
conflict in the exchange relationship is felt or affective. Such conflict is not only present at 
the organizational level, but individuals within the organization tend to make it more 
personal, while their tendencies toward punishing their partners may not always be in the best 
interest of their company (Coughlan et al., 2006). The personalization of conflict makes most 
partners in the relationship to be concerned with the dysfunctional consequences of conflict. 
Conflict becomes personalized when the “inconsistent demands of efficient organization and 
individual growth create anxieties within the individual” (Pondy, 1967, p. 302). If affective 
conflict is not managed effectively and quite early, it canbecome manifest conflict that 
involves particularly negative behavior including lack of support to the partner, blocking of 
their initiatives, and preventing them from achieving their goals (Coughlan et al., 2006).
Researchers, who view conflict as a multi-component phenomenon with both negative 
and positive outcomes, distinguish between constructive conflict and destructive conflict for 
the development and existence of the relationship. For instance, Song and colleagues (2006) 
defined constructive (destructive) conflict as a state, when employees (do not) feel good 
about their working relationships after conflict dynamics occurred. These authors’ findings 
(i.e., a negative link between compromise conflict-resolution style and destructive conflict 
9 
 
and the absence of a significant connection between compromise and constructive conflict) 
suggest that constructive and destructive conflict “may not be at opposite ends of a conflict 
continuum, as is commonly supposed, but instead may represent different concepts” (p. 352).  
For present purposes we adopt this perspective and thus differentiate between two 
distinct types of conflict: functional and dysfunctional. Functional conflict is viewed as 
disagreements that concern the tasks of each party and focus on different viewpoints about 
the accomplishment of common goals in the relationship (Bobot, 2011; Rose & Shoham, 
2004). It constitutes an assessment of the results of the two parties' efforts to manage 
differences in perceptions or disagreements in a way that is beneficial to the relationship 
(Anderson & Narus, 1990). Dysfunctional conflict concerns Menon et al. (1996) unhealthy 
behaviors between the partners that involve friction, anger, classes, and tension in their 
interactions that can build hostility and distrust (Menon et al., 1996; Thomas, 1992). Such 
conflict typically creates obstacles that inhibit relationship decisions and ultimately has the 
potential to hurt the cross-border business exchanges (Rose & Shoham, 2004; Ruekert & 
Walker, 1987).  This empirical inquiry focuses on power source drivers and performance 
outcomes of both functional conflict and dysfunctional conflict in cross-border business 
associations. Informed by both the international marketing and channel conflict literature, we 
examine the relationships of functional and dysfunctional conflict with performance 
outcomes and the potentially important role that problem-solving conflict resolution strategy 
and power distance within a firm’s operating environment play in moderating these links. In 
addition, drawing on the broad power literature, we distinguish between coercive and non-
coercive power bases and investigate how the use of these power bases is linked to functional 
and dysfunctional conflict. Figure 1 exhibits the conceptual framework in this study. 
Subsequently, we present the development of our research hypotheses. 
… Insert Figure 1 here … 
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2.2. Coercive and non-coercive power and functional and dysfunctional conflict 
Power and its sources have been researched by many scholars (e.g., Frazier, Gill, & 
Kale, 1989; Gaski & Nevin, 1985; Hunt & Nevin, 1974; Moore, Birthwistle, & Burt, 2004; 
Zhuang et al., 2010), especially in domestic market contexts (Katsikeas, Leonidou, & 
Morgan, 2000). In the literature (e.g., Johnson, Sakano, & Onzo, 1990; Zhuang & Zhou, 
2004), there are two basic viewpoints as regards the origins of power. One viewpoint stems 
from dependence-power theory and views a channel member’s power over another as derived 
from that firm’s dependence on the dominating firm (Frazier et al., 1989). The second 
viewpoint, drawing from French and Raven’s (1959) thinking, recognizes the existence of 
power bases that underpin power relations in buyer–seller trading associations (e.g., 
Katsikeas et al., 2000; Zhuang & Zhou, 2004). In line with this latter standpoint, for present 
purposes we follow the distinction between coercive and non-coercive power that is most 
widely employed in the literature (Rawwas et al., 1997; Yavas, 1997; Zhuang et al., 2010).2  
While coercive power is commonly associated with the imposition of punishments by 
one party on the other, non-coercive power is typically reflected in the use of rewards. Non-
coercive power concerns the ability of one party to offer rewards to and/or remove or reduce 
sanctions imposed on the other party (e.g., Brown, Lusch, & Muehling, 1983). The literature 
highlights the important role of financial rewards, as opposed to non-financial ones, granted 
to a member for altering their behavior (Coughlan et al., 2006). Use of rewards usually yields 
better results than the adoption of coercive measures (e.g., punishments). The ability of one 
party to offer positive elements (e.g., promotional efforts, unique market information, and 
special privileges) and to remove or lower negative elements received by the counterpart 
                                                          
2
 Other typologies have also been proposed in the literature. One approach concerns the distinction between 
mediated (i.e., promises of reward, threats of punishment, and legalistic strategies) and non-mediated 
(information exchange, requests, and recommendations) influence strategies (e. ., Johnson et al., 1990). Another 
classification is between economic (i.e., reward, coercion, and legal legitimate) and non-economic (expertise, 




(e.g., Brown et al., 1983; Raven, 2008) is a reflection of reward power. In this study’s 
research context, exporting firms can provide their overseas partners with varying kinds of 
assistance or rewards including attractive margins, promotional allowances, credit facilities, 
and exclusive rights; likewise, importing distributors can provide their foreign suppliers with 
similar types of rewards or assistance including promotional support, conducting local market 
research, offering business advice, ordering new products, and making prompt payment 
(Gaski & Nevin, 1985; Katsikeas et al., 2000). Such elements represent a positive working 
climate in the relationship where each party is perceived by the other firm to be at a good 
position to make assessments of the partner’s actions in a fair way, draw the attention of the 
partnering firm to this firm’s actions when these are not well considered by them, provide 
valuable information to the counterpart, and/or receive the suggestions and judgment of their 
overseas partner in a positive fashion.  
We argue that non-coercive power actions using such rewards or assistance are likely 
to influence different types of conflict between the exporter and the importer in different 
ways. More specifically, rewards that are granted by one party to influence the behavior of 
the counterpart may be interpreted by the partner as positive acts that can facilitate 
constructive interactions between the parties. It is expected that such actions will serve as a 
platform for both the importer and exporter to enhance interactions to inject and utilize 
elements of understanding of each other’s ways of working and requirements and sensitivity 
to one another’s position and thinking. The parties may also exhibit heightened energy and 
readiness to work together toward productively coping with and addressing disagreements 
and tension in the business association (c.f., Katsikeas et al., 2000). However, use of such 
non-coercive power elements in the form of assistance or rewards is likely to have an 
opposite effect in the case of dysfunctional conflict. It is expected that such assistance or 
rewards are likely to ease dysfunctional conflict in the exporter–importer relationship with 
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the parties engaging in fewer personality clashes with each other and less friction and anger 
in their communication and trading interactions. In fact, offering assistance or granting 
rewards to influence the behavior of the foreign partner may be seen as a positive signal 
within an unhealthy and unconstructive working environment that can reduce friction, anger, 
and dysfunctional behavior in the relationship. It is thus possible to hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 1a: The use of non-coercive power is positively related to functional conflict in 
the relationship. 
Hypothesis 1b: The use of non-coercive power is negatively related to dysfunctional conflict 
in the relationship. 
In contrast, coercive power, viewed as the reverse of reward power, refers to one 
party’s ability to threaten its partner with negative, undesirable consequences or punishments 
when the partner is not willing to comply (e.g. Brown et al., 1983). In other words, it has the 
potential to threaten and harm the partner through the use of sanctions. It stems from one 
party’s position to potentially penalize the other party with undesirable consequences (e.g., 
withdrawal of rewards like exclusive rights and foreign market information, termination of 
contract, undesirable work assignments); imposition of such penalties might take place when 
the counterpart deviates from its relationship tasks (e.g., Brown et al., 1983; Raven 2008). 
The imposition of sanctions (e.g., payment delays, limiting provision of local market 
information, and order reduction by the importer, and withholding unique product 
information, lowering promotional allowances, and deviation from the terms of the 
agreement by the exporter) is expected not to be well received by the foreign counterpart and 
may in fact play a negative and destructive role for the working climate in the relationship. 
Likewise, withdrawal of rewards by a member is not likely to go down well by the other 
party who in return may become non-responsive in the interactions or even react and 
challenge the partnering firm. In other words, the use of coercion or withdrawal of rewards is 
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likely to increase tension and result in dysfunctional behavior in the relationship (e.g., Tikoo, 
2005; Zhuang et al., 2010). Further, the imposition of sanctions may create a negative climate 
in the relationship where the parties are not motivated to interact productively with each other 
and work closely together with the view to discussing their disagreements and resolving their 
conflict in a way that can strengthen interactions and the future of their trading association 
(Coughlan et al., 2006). Based on this thinking, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 2a: The use of coercive power is negatively related to functional conflict in the 
relationship. 
Hypothesis 2b: The use of coercive power is positively related to dysfunctional conflict in the 
relationship. 
2.3 Functional and dysfunctional conflict and performance outcomes 
Functional conflict refers to differences in opinions regarding tasks, procedures, 
strategy, business ideas, and other-business related issues that tend to be openly discussed 
and resolved and facilitate the strengthening of the relationship (Skarmeas, 2006). Such 
conflict is regarded as healthy due to the fact that the outcome that results from "the open-
minded contesting of the diverse perspectives is generally superior to the individual 
perspectives themselves" (Skarmeas, 2006, p. 568). Although disagreements between buyers 
and sellers are typical in work processes (Frazier, 1999), they can rejuvenate, develop, and 
strengthen a relationship if disagreements are handled in proper and productive ways of 
thinking. Functional conflict might serve to help partnering firms to work harder and smarter 
with favorable outcomes for their performance (Jehn & Chatman, 2000; Jehn & Mannix, 
2001). Performance is defined as each partnering firm’s market and financial outcomes 
attained through their business relationship. In trading associations marked by the presence of 
functional conflict, the parties tend to be more willing to look at and accept new ideas and 
views and be receptive to changes suggested by the counterpart if these are beneficial for the 
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future of the relationship (Menon et al., 1996). In addition, the relationship marketing 
literature suggests that buyer–seller interactions are performed via social exchanges between 
employees of the partnering organizations who coordinate the flow of assets, skills, and 
information as they collaborate in their daily operations (Katsikeas et al., 2009). High levels 
of functional conflict may stimulate specific structuring ties that can improve the pattern and 
quality of interactions between the network of employees who engage and coordinate 
activities in the relationship. Structuring ties are employee connection points within the 
importing and exporting partners. Functional conflict is likely to strengthen the structure of 
employee ties by improving the quality of connections and intensity of interactions between 
the partnering firms (McEvily, Perrone, & Zaheer, 2003). Thus, it is hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis 3: Functional conflict is positively related to performance in the relationship.  
In contrast, dysfunctional conflict concerns strong disagreements, underlying 
emotions, and actions (e.g., attacks, clashes, sarcasm) taken by one or both parties that lead to 
frustration and hostility in the relationship. The injection of such negative feelings, attitudes, 
and behaviors in the relationship can create stagnation in the interactions between the 
exchange partners. Such an exchange climate may pull apart and even disintegrate the 
relationship especially if such a situation persists and governs thinking between the parties 
for some time (e.g., Skarmeas, 2006). It is understandable that firms involved in relationships 
characterized by friction, anger, and hostile feelings are likely not to exhibit willingness to 
examine new ideas, make changes, and accommodate their partner's suggestions and 
behavior. Under these circumstances the parties may not have the volition to make special 
efforts to deal productively with difficulties in and challenges facing the relationship. 
Dysfunctional conflict cannot serve as a basis for stimulating people in the exporting and 
importing firms to work harder and smarter (Webb & Hogan, 2002). On the contrary, such 
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conflict poses serious problems for the achievement of relationship goals and may even push 
the parties to develop negative feelings concerning the future of their business association.  
Furthermore, dysfunctional conflict is unable to motivate people in the partnering 
organizations to be proactive in their interactions, as proactivity here requires mobilizing 
behaviors by the two parties that would enable them to contribute their skills and resources to 
coordinate and deploy them in joint activities that are conducive to the attainment of each 
party's goals in the relationship (McEvilly et al., 2003). The inability of dysfunctional conflict 
to stimulate mobilizing behaviors is likely not to activate the exchange parties to make 
productive efforts, integrate their skills and resources, share valuable information, and make 
equitable and fair contributions to the establishment and smooth functioning of relational 
exchange (Katsikeas et al., 2009). The lack of rich connections between members of the two 
sides as well as limited mobilizing forces that mark relationships governed by dysfunctional 
conflict may undermine positive relationship outcomes and result in poor performance for 
each party in the trading association. Hence, it is possible to expect that: 
Hypothesis 4: Dysfunctional conflict is negatively related to performance in the relationship.   
2.4 The importance of problem-solving conflict resolution strategy  
When conflict arises in the relationship, a particularly important task for the exchange 
parties is how to manage conflict effectively. As partnering firms often face restructuring 
challenges, workforce diversity pressures, and communication problems across cross-cultural 
exchange teams, which may nurture conflict, effective conflict management is critical for the 
survival and long-term viability of cross-border trading associations (e.g., Gadde, Hakansson, 
& Persson, 2010; Ma, 2007; Song et al., 2006). The conflict-handling literature (e.g. Koza & 
Dant, 2007; Ma, 2007) distinguishes between distributive conflict resolution, which is based 
on a “win-lose” approach to solving conflict by maximizing own gains while minimizing 
losses for the partner, and integrative conflict resolution, which involves a “win-win” 
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approach with both parties seeking common interests and mutual benefits through open 
information exchange and joint decision-making (Putnam, 1990).  
Notwithstanding different strategies of conflict resolution that can be identified in the 
literature (e.g., Koza & Dant, 2007; Song et al., 2006), for the purpose of this study we focus 
on the deployment of problem-solving strategy because of its integrative approach to and 
collaborative style in conflict solving. Thus, for present purposes, problem solving conflict 
resolution concerns the parties’ integrative behavior when assertiveness and cooperativeness 
between them is high in efforts to deal with highly complex, conflictual issues (Rahim, 
Antonini, & Psenicks, 2001). The focus of this research on exporter–importer dyads is in 
consonance with the use of this conflict resolution strategy, as it enables the parties to take 
account of each other’s ways of working, requirements, and goals in attempts to resolve 
disagreements and conflictual behaviors (e.g., Koza and Dant, 2007). This is particularly 
important for cross-border relationships that are typically characterized by geographical 
separation and cultural distance between suppliers and organizational customers, which may 
cause communication difficulties, misunderstanding, and conflictual tendencies in 
international exchange partnerships (e.g., Bello et al., 2010).   
We argue that the performance impact of conflict in the relationship is influenced by 
the extent to which the parties resort to problem-solving conflict resolution. When conflict 
resolution efforts are essentially governed by this mutual, “win-win” strategy, the occurrence 
of constructive disagreements allows partnering firms to function smoothly and attain 
strategic goals in the relationship. Due in part to its inherently positive elements, high 
functional conflict under such conflict resolution conditions is likely to serve as a platform on 
which firms can build and strengthen interactions. Nonetheless, problem-solving 
collaboration for dealing with conflict requires resources in terms of information, time, and 
energy. Drawing from the inter-organizational exchange literature (e.g., Katsikeas et al., 
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2009; Wicks, Berman, & Jones, 1999), weposit that when valuable, non-substitutable 
resources are exchanged, performance outcomes which result from functional conflict in 
relationships governed by problem-solving conflict resolution are likely to improve for two 
reasons. First, problem-solving conflict resolution strategies strengthen the ability of 
functional conflict to lower transaction costs because, with thinking of collaboration and 
mutuality in addressing disagreements, the potential to gain more increases and each party 
can lose so much to the extent that likely benefits from exploitation decrease relative to the 
likely benefits from ongoing collaboration with a valuable, not-easily-replaceable partner 
(c.f., Katsikeas et al., 2009; Kumar, Sheer, & Steenkamp, 1998). Second, this problem-
solving approach amplifies functional conflict’s aptitude to elevate transaction value, because 
efforts to coordinate valuable resources and deploy them productively in dealing with tension 
and disagreements that have the potential to be constructively resolved can boost payoffs in 
the relationship (c.f., Wicks et al., 1999). It is therefore expected that: 
Hypothesis 5a: Problem-solving conflict resolution positively impacts the functional conflict–
performance link, thus boosting the positive performance effects of functional conflict. 
 
However, we suggest that, in the presence of dysfunctional tension and disagreements 
in the interactions between the parties, efforts to fully address such conflict in a productive 
way for the relationship might be particularly challenging even if the parties can recognize 
the benign role of collaborative, “win-win” style of a problem-solving approach to conflict 
resolution. Negative and destructive elements inherent in such conflict inhibit partnering 
firms to function smoothly and achieve strategic goals in the business relationship. 
Nonetheless, the communication and discussion of problems involved in problem-solving 
conflict resolution may mitigate the impact of destructive elements associated with 
dysfunctional conflict. In other words, such a conflict resolution strategy is likely to play an 
instrumental role that can soften strong conflictual behavior and somehow improve 
essentially unproductive interactions between the two parties. Based on relational exchange 
18 
 
reasoning (e.g., Bello et al., 2010; Wicks et al., 1999), we argue that when the parties have 
made commitments to high-value, irreplaceable resource exchanges, performance outcomes 
from dysfunctional conflict in trading associations marked by a problem-solving conflict 
resolution strategy are likely to weaken. This problem-solving strategy has the capacity to 
lower dysfunctional conflict’s tendency to reduce transaction value. Attempts to use valuable 
resources in productively dealing with conflict can be seen by the partner as accommodating 
and useful, potentially easing the pressures of disagreements and tension in the relationship 
and tempering their inherently damaging effects on relationship outcomes (c.f., Wicks et al., 
1999). Furthermore, because of its emphasis on collaboration, open discussion, and 
information sharing in addressing conflict, problem-solving conflict resolution strategies are 
expected to reduce the ability of dysfunctional conflict to increase transaction costs in the 
interactions between the two parties (c.f., Kumar et al., 1998). Thus, we can advance that: 
Hypothesis 5b: Problem-solving conflict resolution adversely impacts the dysfunctional 
conflict–performance link, thus lowering the negative performance effects of dysfunctional 
conflict. 
 
2.5 Power distance as a culture-specific factor in exporter–importer relationships 
In the context of firms’ international business, different aspects of cross-national 
distance (e.g., economic, financial, political, administrative) have been examined in the 
literature, and cultural distance is an issue that has received particular attention (Berry, 
Guillen & Zhou, 2010). As our study’s focus is on relationships between exchange partners 
based in different countries, account should be taken of cultural distance that refers to 
differences in attitudes toward authority, trust, individuality, and importance of work and 
family (Berry et al., 2010). To consider the relevance of such distance within the context of 
our study, we draw from Hofstede’s (2001) national culture framework and focus specifically 
on power distance that is a distinct dimension of national culture. In cross-border 
relationships, power distance concerns the degree to which the less powerful people in 
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(exporting and importing) firms within a specific country expect and accept that power is 
distributed unequally (c.f., Hofstede, 2001). This dimension indicates that senior managers in 
exporting and importing firms tend to make decisions without asking the opinions of people 
at lower organizational positions and avoid interactions with and delegation of tasks to lower 
level employees for making decisions concerning the relationship.  
We contend that the effects of functional and dysfunctional conflict on performance 
are conditioned by the degree of power distance within the firm and its operational 
environment. Power distance entails decision making within a firm that is mainly driven by 
the active engagement of senior executives who guide employees as regards operational 
aspects and everyday exchanges and interactions with the international trading partner. 
Greater centralization, avoidance of social interaction, and little employee involvement in 
decision making within a firm may discourage contact employees to take initiatives and 
accommodating actions that could benefit the relationship and limit their engagement and 
freedom in dealings with the foreign trading firm (c.f., Bello et al., 2010). Such a situation is 
likely to weaken the impact of the positive elements of functional conflict on performance 
outcomes. In contrast, greater participation of contact employees in decisions concerning the 
relationship with the foreign exchange partner may not only provide them with an 
opportunity to more productively utilize their skills and experience, but also motivate them to 
engage in regular interactions and closer collaboration with the partner, which can boost the 
beneficial effects of functional conflict. However, the presence of high power distance and 
the resultant limited involvement and freedom of contact employees in relationship decisions 
is likely to introduce rigidity and institutionalization in relationship interactions, enhancing 
the negative effect of dysfunctional conflict on relationship outcomes. Contact employees 
may be frightened by high managerial involvement and centralization in decision making and 
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thus be reluctant to take initiatives in facilitating collaboration and developing closer 
relational exchanges (c.f., Hofstede, 2001). Thus, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 6a: Power distance negatively impacts the functional conflict–performance link, 
thus decreasing the positive performance effects of functional conflict. 
 
Hypothesis 6b: Power distance positively impacts the dysfunctional conflict–performance 
link, thus increasing the negative performance effects of dysfunctional conflict. 
 
3. Methods 
3.1 Research context and design 
We tested the research hypotheses using survey data of both Slovene exporters and 
their corresponding distributors overseas. Distributors are an attractive foreign market entry 
mode for exporting firms, due in part to the relatively low commitments of resources and 
capabilities that exporting firms need to make in attempts to establish and develop overseas 
market operations (e.g., Katsikeas et al., 2009; Skarmeas, Zeriti, & Baltas, 2016). The use of 
dyadic data is a particular feature of our study as it enables the study of both sides of the 
international exchange partnership, notwithstanding the difficulties involved in collecting 
such data in cross-border buyer–seller relationships. The composition of our two samples 
includes low- and high-tech companies in terms of the products manufactured by exporters 
and those that distributed by distributors in their local market with the goal to enhance the 
generalizability of the study results. Concerning the locations of foreign distributors covered 
in the study, we focused on the E.U. (particularly Germany, Croatia, Austria, France and 
Italy) and ex-Yugoslavian markets because they are the primary export market regions for 
Slovene firms (SURS, 2015). Slovenia is a typical Central European country and one of the 
smaller E.U. markets that is particularly export oriented with most of its trading partners 
being other members of the E.U.   
The unit of analysis is the specific business relationship between the exporter and 
importer. Since a company can export more than one product or product line to more than 
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one market or market segment, when answering the questions, we asked survey participants 
to bear in mind their main product or product line that they exported. This decision was made 
as prior research (e.g. Katsikeas et al., 2000) suggests that providing responses which reflect 
an average to cover all products or all exporter–import relationships may introduce 
considerable noise and produce misleading results. Furthermore, we placed emphasis on the 
detection and choice of knowledgeable individuals within exporting and importing companies 
to target for this research. Our pre-study qualitative fieldwork suggested that usually there is 
only one manager (e.g. export/marketing manager on the supplier’s side, subsidiary or import 
manager on the customer’s side) who has the responsibility for dealing with the foreign 
partner and the management of the specific cross-border relationship. This individual was the 
target for us in our collection efforts of exporter and importer dyadic data. 
3.2 Field interviews and questionnaire development 
We contacted exploratory field interviews with six managers in exporting firms and 
four managers in import distributor companies prior to the execution of the exporter and 
importer surveys. All managers perceived the existence of conflict between the parties as 
having adverse consequences for the working relationship. However, some managers 
suggested that they sometimes have disagreements with their overseas counterparts, but the 
two parties make efforts to work together with the view to resolving such potentially negative 
situations. One managers also noted that “we do not have conflict with our foreign 
distributor; sometimes we just have communication misunderstandings.” In addition to 
recognizing the different types of conflict between the exchange partners, the field interviews 
helped us verify the relevance of the study constructs and the plausibility of the proposed 
conceptual model. In addition, an attempt was made in these interviews to discuss with 
managers the measures of the study constructs and ensure that these were developed and 
adapted in a way that were meaningful to participants in the study. 
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We drafted the survey questionnaire following a systematic literature review and 
interviews with managers. Data were gathered by sending out two sets of questionnaires: one 
questionnaire that assessed the exporter–importer relationship from the standpoint of the 
Slovene exporter; and another that assessed this relationship from the standpoint of the 
foreign distributor. As the fieldwork interviews suggested that exporters and importers 
typically use English as the language of their business interactions and communications, the 
questionnaire was developed in English for collecting the data for this study. However, in 
some cases Slovene managers or their corresponding foreign distributors were not proficient 
in English and their interactions were based in their local language. In those cases, the 
questionnaire was translated in the relevant local language and then was back-translated into 
English in an effort to ensure face validity and enhance the response rate and number of the 
dyads in our study. We used three academicians who had research interests in and were 
familiar with research in inter-firm relationships and international marketing to assess the 
face and content validity of the questionnaire and compare the two versions. Several changes 
were made to the exporter questionnaire and few minor changes made to the importer one. 
The questionnaire was then pre-tested on samples of 12 Slovene exporters and 10 foreign 
distributors. As a result, the survey questionnaire and completion time were shortened, while 
some language modifications enhanced flow and comprehension of all the questions used.  
3.3 Construct operationalization 
Multi-item scales were used to operationalize all study constructs. In addition, five-
point relative response formats were used in all cases. The questions were the same for both 
sides of the international exchange dyad, as the study examines exporter and importer 
perceptions of power bases, functional and dysfunctional conflict, problem-solving conflict 
resolution, power distance, and performance in the relationship. The measurement scales are 
presented in Appendix 1. Next we describe the measures for our constructs.  
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Power sources. For present purposes, following practice established in prior research 
on channels (e.g. Gaski & Nevin, 1985; Lusch & Brown, 1986; Meehan & Wright, 2012), we 
distinguish between coercive and non-coercive sources of power from the perspectives of 
both exporters and importers. More specifically, we used six items to measure non-coercive 
power and three items to assess coercive power. The scale items for coercive and non-
coercive power sources are based in previous studies (e.g. Gaski & Nevin, 1985; Katsikeas et 
al., 2000; Swasy, 1979) and adapted in pre-study interviews with managers in exporting and 
importing firms. We used a five-point Likert rating scale, anchored by (1) “strongly disagree” 
and (5) “strongly agree”, to tap participant managers’ responses to individual questions.  
Conflict. Consistent with dominant thinking among more recent studies (e.g. 
Geyskens et al., 1999; Menon et al., 1996; Skarmeas, 2006), we pursue the distinction 
between functional and dysfunctional conflict as the aim was to adopt a broadened view of 
conflict that encompasse  both aspects of the concept. With this in mind, we operationalized 
functional conflict using four items that were adapted from Song et al. (2006). Responses to 
questions pertaining to functional conflict were captured using a five-point Likert scale, 
ranging from (1) “strongly disagree” to (5) “strongly agree”.  We likewise employed four 
items to measure dysfunctional conflict, which was grounded on Rose et al. (2007) and 
adapted on the basis of field interviews. A five-point rating scale, anchored by (1) “not at all” 
and (5) “very much”, was used to tap responses concerning dysfunctional conflict. 
Performance in the relationship. This study focuses on a firm’s performance through 
the relationship with a specific foreign partner. Performance thus concerns each partnering 
firm’s market and financial outcomes achieved through the specific trading association. We 
used seven items to assess performance of each party, borrowed from prior research (e.g., 
Katsikeas et al., 2009; Zou et al., 1998) and adapted in field interviews. We tapped responses 
on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from (1) “strongly disagree” to (5) “strongly agree”. 
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Problem-solving conflict resolution. We employed four items, adapted from Koza 
and Dant (2007), to measure the deployment of problem solving conflict resolution strategies 
in the exporter–importer relationship. Our assessment of this construct focuses on distinct 
behavioral characteristics rather than on their consequences (Van de Vliert & Kabanoff, 
1990). Responses to questions pertaining to problem solving conflict resolution were tapped 
on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from (1) “strongly disagree” to (5) “strongly agree”. 
Power distance. We employed five items, adapted from Yoo and Donthu (2005), to 
measure the cross-culturally specific traits of the respondents. The items used focus on the 
power distance perception of individual in the society relatively to others, as originally 
measured by Hofstede (2001). Respondents were assessing their power distance on a five-
point Likert scale, ranging from (1) “strongly disagree” to (5) “strongly agree”. 
3.4 Data collection 
The sampling frame used for this study was the list of Slovenian exporters provided in 
the SloExport database. This database enabled us to identify potential respondents within 
firms and provided objective information on company characteristics (e.g. number of 
employees, sales revenue in domestic and foreign markets). We focused on firms with 
established exporting operations and thus used two criteria to select exporters for our study: 
first, firms had to operate in at least three foreign markets; and, second, at least 50 percent of 
their sales revenue should be generated from their overseas market operations. Data were 
collected on the basis of using an online survey tool. Initially we sent the questionnaire to a 
specific manager in the exporting firm whose name and contact details were specified in the 
database or identified by contacting the firm via the telephone. Subsequently, supported by 
those managers in exporting firms who responded and completed the questionnaire, we 
contacted the overseas distributors of these exporters and requested their participation in this 
online survey. Internet surveys offer several advantages including enabling the researcher to 
25 
 
collect data rapidly and at a low cost, as surveys can be sent out worldwide and responses 
received quickly (Craig & Douglas, 2005). There is also no interviewer bias and limited 
potential to introduce social desirability biasing influences on the results (Malhotra, 2002). 
We randomly selected 1000 companies from the database and contacted them via 
email to check their contact details, assess their eligibility for the study, and where necessary 
identify an appropriate informant.  A total of 264 emails were returned as undelivered. Of the 
736 firms remaining, 291 companies were ineligible for the study. In their replies to our 
initial email, they replied to indicate that they do not currently export, had been exporting for 
less than three years and/or to fewer than three foreign markets, their export sales accounted 
for less than 50 percent of their total sales, did not operate through foreign distributors, or had 
a policy of not disclosing any company information. This process resulted in a total of 445 
companies that were eligible and expressed willingness to participate in the study. We 
emailed the managers identified in these companies as willing and able to participate and 
kindly asked them to complete the survey questionnaire. We paid particular attention to 
emphasizing the importance of this project, their role in contributing to the study’s success, 
and the anonymity of responses. After three waves of questionnaires and a series of telephone 
calls over a period of three months, 184 usable exporter questionnaires were gathered for a 
response rate of 41 percent. Based on the support of this group of exporters, we contacted 
their overseas distributors and asked them to complete the questionnaire with regard to the 
specific foreign supplier relationship. Using three questionnaire waves and telephone calls to 
managers in these distributor companies overseas over a period of nearly three months, we 
managed to receive 105 replies from importers with fully usable questionnaires that 
represents a response rate of 57 percent. Hence, our samples of exporters and importers 
represent 105 relationship pairs and these data are used for analysis purposes in this study.  
3.5 Informant quality and sample description 
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At the end of the exporter and importer questionnaires we had several questions that 
helped us assess the degree of informant knowledge about the company and its operations as 
well as the particular exporter–importer relationship. Informants were asked to indicate the 
number of years they had been with the company, the number of years at the specific job 
position covering international operations, and the number of years directly involved in the 
focal relationship with the foreign partner. In most cases, respondents in exporting and 
importing companies had significant experience with the company, its international 
operations, and the specific relationship. In those cases where respondents reported less than 
three years’ experience in any of these three questions, the questionnaire was eliminated from 
the analysis and an attempt was made to identify someone else in the company with longer 
experience and engagement with the specific relationship to participate in the study. In this 
way, the procedure we followed enabled us to ensure sufficient respondent experience and 
knowledge of the issues investigated in each of the two samples.  
In each of the two samples, the individual exporter–importer relationship was the 
focus of investigation. In the exporter’s sample, respondents were between 27 and 67 years of 
age. Export managers were most commonly represented in the sample (39%), followed by 
CEOs (32%), marketing managers (11%), and senior sales representatives (11%). Most 
respondents (58%) have been working for a firm in a high-tech industry and 42% for a firm 
in a low-tech sector. In terms of size, 56% of the exporters had up to 250 employees, while 
the remainder were larger companies. On average, firms have been operating for 48 years, 
exporting for 24 years, and operating in 18 foreign markets. In the importer’s sample, 
participants were between 23 and 56 years old. A total of 44% of the respondents were sales 
and purchasing managers, followed by CEOs (38%), marketing managers (10%), and senior 
purchasing officers (5%). Most respondents (58%) likewise have been working for a 
company in a high-tech sector, and the remainder (42%) for a firm in a low-tech industry. 
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Most importing firms are based in and cover Germany (17%), followed by Serbia (15%), 
Croatia (14%), Italy (6%), Czech Republic (6%), and Austria (5%), which corresponds to the 
foreign markets most frequently served by Slovenian exporters (SURS, 2016). Concerning 
the size of the importing firms, 67% had up to 250 employees, and the remaining 33% were 
larger companies. On average, the participant firms have been operating for 31 years, 
importing 17 years, and dealing with suppliers in 12 overseas markets. 
3.6 Nonresponse bias 
We considered the issue of possible nonresponse bias by making two checks in each 
of the exporter and importer groups. The first check concerned a comparison between early 
and late respondents using a t-test procedure. No statistically significant mean differences 
were found in any of the study constructs and firm characteristics (i.e. number of employees, 
sales volume, and relationship length) between early and late respondents for the samples of 
exporters and importers. The second check focused on a comparison of respondents in each 
of the exporter and importer samples with a random group of 39 nonresponding exporters and 
32 nonresponding importers, respectively, with respect to key firm characteristics (i.e. 
number of employees and sales volume). We again found the absence of significant 
differences between the groups of respondents and non-respondents in each of the two 
samples. Thus, nonresponse bias does not appear to be a serious problem in this research.  
 
4. Analysis and results 
4.1 Validation of measures  
We followed Nunnally and Bernstein’s (1994) procedure for assessing and validating 
the measures of our study constructs. First, we performed exploratory factor analysis within 
the exporter and importer samples for all the constructs. The aim was to identify and remove 
problematic items, these being items that had low factor loadings or exhibited high cross 
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loadings. Second, we performed reliability analyses for our measurement scales, which 
indicated that the Cronbach’s alpha values of the study’s constructs range between .66 and 
.87. Most measures show adequate reliability levels, but some scales in the importer sample 
exhibit a Cronbach’s alpha score slightly lower than .70, the recommended threshold.  
We assessed the validity of our measures using confirmatory factor analysis (see 
Table 1 for construct measurement models). Due to the relatively small sample sizes as a 
result of our focus on dyadic exporter–importer data, we ran two measurement models in 
each of the exporter and importer groups. As shown in Table 1, in each group one 
measurement model contained the constructs non-coercive power, coercive power, functional 
conflict, and dysfunctional conflict, and another measurement model included the constructs 
problem solving conflict resolution and performance outcomes from the relationship. In 
running the models, we used the maximum likelihood estimation procedure in AMOS. 
Convergent validity, which concerns the “extent to which indicators of a specific construct 
converge or share a high proportion of variance in common” (Hair et al., 2010, p. 689), is 
achieved if the overall goodness-of-fit indices demonstrate a good fit to the data and 
standardized factor loadings are high  and significant (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988). Our 
results provide evidence of good fit of the measurement models to the data; not bly, in all 
cases, standardized loadings are high (i.e., ≥ .50) and significant.  
…Insert Table 1 here… 
Discriminant validity, which concerns the extent to which a measure is distinct from 
all other measures in the study, was assessed by applying two different procedures in each of 
the exporter and importer samples. First, we followed the procedure of Anderson and 
Gerbing (1988) and conducted chi-square difference tests in which the correlation between all 
pairs of construct measures is once estimated freely and then fixed to one. In all pairs, the 
chi-square difference between the constrained and unconstraint models was greater than 3.84, 
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thus exhibiting a significant chi-square difference test statistic. Second, we followed Fornell 
and Larcker’s (1981) more stringent approach. In all cases the correlation between two 
construct measures was lower than the square root of the average variance extracted for each 
of these measures. In sum, the two methods indicate that our study measures exhibit 
discriminant validity. Table 2 presents correlations, reliability estimates, and descriptive 
statistics for the study constructs. 
…Insert Table 2 here… 
 
4.2 Tests of hypotheses 
We employed regression analysis to test our research hypotheses. Three multiple 
regression models were estimated using ordinary least squares. As shown in Table 3, the 
results suggest that non-coercive power is not significantly related to functional conflict in 
the exporter (b = -.04, t = -.28, p > .10) and importer (b = -.03, t = -.30, p > .10) samples, thus 
lending no support to Hypothesis 1a. Additionally, coercive power is negatively related to 
functional conflict only in the exporter sample (b = -.28, t = -2.48, p < .05), as per Hypothesis 
2a, but there is no significant link in the importer sample (b = -.03, t = -.30, p > .10). 
Moreover, in support of Hypothesis 2b, coercive power has a negative effect on dysfunctional 
conflict in both the exporter (b = .31, t = 4.23, p < .01) and importer (b = .33, t = 3.66, p < 
.01) samples. We also find that non-coercive power has a negative effect on dysfunctional 
conflict in the exporter sample (b = -.37, t = -4.39, p < .01), in concert with Hypothesis 1b, 
but no significant relationship was found in the importer sample (b = -.14, t = -1.20, p > .10).     
Concerning the connections between the two different types of conflict and 
performance, the results suggest that the presence of functional conflict in the cross-border 
relationship positively affects performance in the importer sample (b = .22, t = 2.70, p < .01), 
in support of Hypothesis 3. However, this hypothesis is not validated in the exporter sample, 
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as the results show that functional conflict has no direct performance effect (b = -.06, t = -.87, 
p > .10). Further, Hypothesis 4, suggesting that dysfunctional conflict is negatively related to 
performance, is not validated in our samples of exporter (b = .07, t = .07, p > .10) and 
importers (b = .03, t = .37, p > .10). The results also indicate that problem-solving conflict 
resolution strategy plays an important moderating role in the relationships of functional and 
dysfunctional conflict with performance outcomes. Specifically, we find that problem-solving 
conflict resolution positively affects the functional conflict–performance link in the exporter 
sample (b = .31, t = 2.79, p < .05), in line with Hypothesis 5a, but negatively influences this 
link in the importer sample (b = -.33, t = -2.08, p < .05), which refutes Hypothesis 5a. In line 
with Hypothesis 5b, the results suggest problem-solving conflict resolution negatively affects 
the link between dysfunctional conflict and performance outcomes in both the exporter (b = -
.33, t = -2.22, p < .05) and importer (b = -.36, t = -2.05, p < .05) samples. In addition, the 
results indicate that power distance boosts the negative effects of dysfunctional conflict on 
performance in the exporter (b = -.46, t = -3.71, p < .01) and importer (b = -.11, t = -1.69, p < 
.10) samples, in support of Hypothesis 6b. However, Hypothesis 6a, suggesting power 
distance negatively impacts the functional conflict–performance link, is not validated across 
the exporter (b = .12, t = 1.18, p > .10) and importer (b = -.12, t = -.85, p > .10) samples. 
…Insert Table 3 here… 
4.3 Additional analyses  
As we collected the data at one point in time and on the basis of a single informant’s 
self-reporting, common method variance may lead to inflated estimates of the hypothesized 
relationships. In the data collection process, we used procedures recommended by Podsakoff 
and associates (2003) in an effort to limit the possibility of such bias including developing 
clear scale items and instructions, promising response anonymity and confidentiality, 
assuring potential respondents that there were no right or wrong answers, and structuring 
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questionnaire questions under general topics rather than specific constructs. Further, we 
assessed empirically the presence of common method bias in two ways. First, we employed 
Harman’s one-factor test (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). Concerning the exporters’ sample, the 
results revealed seven factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0, as expected, but no factor 
accounted for the bulk of the total variance. In fact, factor 1 explained 18.88% of the 
variance. In a similar vein, in the importers’ sample Factor 1 accounted only for 13.99% of 
the variance. Second, we employed the marker variable test, which is widely used to testing 
for possible biasing effects of common method variance on the empirical results (e.g., 
Zeugner-Roth, Zabkar, & Diamantopoulos, 2016). In each of the two samples, we adjusted 
the correlations between constructs using the second smallest correlation in the correlation 
matrix. In both the exporter and importer samples, we identified no major differences in the 
adjusted correlations from the initial correlation coefficients and no significant correlation 
was reduced to non-significant levels (e.g., Malhotra, Kim, & Patil, 2006). In sum, common 
method bias does not appear to influence the results in the exporter and importer samples. 
In addition, we compared exporters and their corresponding foreign customers and 
revealed significant differences with regard to some of the study constructs. Exporters 
possessed significantly higher levels of coercive power than importers (t = 7.64, p < .01), but 
importers were found to possess higher levels of non-coercive power (t = -5.77, p < .01) than 
exporters. Exporters also saw significantly higher levels of dysfunctional conflict in the 
relationship than their importing partners (t = 7.35, p < .01). No significant differences were 
detected between exporters and importers as regards the levels of functional conflict, problem 
solving, power distance, and performance in the relationship.3 
                                                          
3 Differences in perceptions of coercive and non-coercive power in the export r and importer dyads had no 
significant influences on functional and dysfunctional conflict in each of t e two samples. Likewise, differences 
in the levels of functional and dysfunctional conflict between the two partners had no discerning effect on 
performance in the relationship in both samples.   
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To deepen understanding of our exporter and importer dyadic performance data, we 
examined response differences between the two partnering firms in all pairs of performance 
items in our scale. Interestingly, in the bulk of our sample exporter–importer dyads, we found 
no big gaps between the two partners as regards the performance outcomes achieved by each 
party in the relationship. The differences between exporters and importers were ≤ 1 for over 
90 percent of the cases. This suggests that, in the vast majority of dyads, the parties perceive 
that each makes equitable gains from the relationship, which is important to the development 
and continuance of their business exchanges in the long-term (e.g., Palmatier et al., 2013). 
 
5. Discussion  
5.1 Theoretical implications 
Much of the research on conflict focuses on the negative connotations of conflict, 
while scant attention is given to the importance of functional conflict in cross-border trading 
associations (e.g., Skarmeas, 2006). By viewing conflict as essentially being dysfunctional 
and paying no consideration to its functionality, the inter-firm relationship literature offers a 
limited picture of this phenomenon. As opposed to the vast part of extant research, we 
distinguish between functional and dysfunctional conflict and offer an empirical explanation 
regarding how the two forms of conflict are linked to performance and the extent to which 
these are affected by the use of coercive and non-coercive power in exporter–importer 
relationships. Importantly, this research differs from previous studies on cross-cultural buyer–
seller relations by examining drivers and performance consequences of functional and 
dysfunctional conflict in dyadic relationships of exporters and importers, thus taking account 
of both sides of international exchanges. 
Our study suggests that the use of coercive power appears to play a more important 
role in influencing conflict than the exercise of non-coercive power. We demonstrate that use 
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of coercion increases dysfunctional conflict, which is consistent with most research on 
conflict that is traditionally considered to be bad for relationship building (e.g., Rawwas et al. 
1997; Zhuang et al. 2010). We add to this stream of research on conflict by empirically 
showing that the use of coercion results in lower levels of functional conflict (among 
exporters), which is essentially seen as a productive means of revitalizing and strengthening 
relational exchanges. By contrast, the evidence cited in this study reveals that the use of non-
coercive power plays no role in influencing the presence of functional conflict in the 
relationship. Nonetheless, the use of rewards were found to play an instrumental role in 
reducing dysfunctional conflict, though this link does not reach significance in the importer 
group. This result is particularly interesting and corresponds to empirical evidence among 
international marketing alliances that highlights the positive role that a firm’s accommodation 
of the partner’s deviation from accomplishing its alliance tasks plays in influencing alliance 
performance (Bello et al., 2010). It is also consistent with previous studies (e.g., Lusch, 1976; 
Rawwas et al., 1997) pinpointing the benefits that underpin informational, referent, and 
legitimate (non-coercive) sources of power and their potential to ease dysfunctional conflict.  
Exporters and importers are likely to have a better understanding of each other, when 
they are involved in a competitive relationship characterized by more frequent (functional 
and dysfunctional) conflict than in a purely cooperative relationship (Forker & Stannack, 
2000). This research shows that dysfunctional conflict in cross-border relationships seems not 
to affect negatively each party’s performance in the relationship, which is not in line with 
what one would expect in practice. Likewise, functional conflict between exporters and 
exporters does not appear to produce positive performance results among exporters. Only 
among foreign distributors functional conflict can yield healthy performance outcomes as the 
conflict literature suggests. This absence of direct performance effects of dysfunctional 
conflict among both exporters and importers, which is also the case for functional conflict in 
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the exporter group, may imply that in relationships marked by geographical and cultural 
separation conflictual interactions between the parties appear unable to have unequivocal 
performance implications. Does this mean that in cross-border exchanges partners move on 
with current business and the state of affairs and thus live with conflict of one kind or 
another, or do the performance effects of functional and dysfunctional conflict take time to 
unfold? This is an issue that future empirical inquiry may find it fruitful to investigate. 
Mixed findings concerning the relationship of conflict with performance prompted us 
to investigate potentially important factors moderating this link. We contribute to this stream 
of research not only by recognizing the presence of functional and dysfunctional conflict in 
cross-border exchanges, but also by identifying conditions pertaining to problem solving 
conflict resolution and power distance under which the relationships of the two types of 
conflict with performance vary. Specifically, power distance was found to be influential in 
enhancing the inherently negative impact of dysfunctional conflict on performance among 
both exporters and importers. Moreover, when problem-solving conflict resolution strategy is 
deployed, functional conflict enhances while dysfunctional conflict reduces performance 
among exporters. However, in the group of importers, we encountered surprising findings: 
when problem solving conflict resolution strategy is used, both functional conflict and 
dysfunctional conflict appear to reduce importing firms’ performance. Pragmatically, this 
implies that this approach to conflict resolution may not be an appropriate mechanism to 
implement as it seems to be unable to materialize among foreign distributors the inherently 
beneficial elements of functional conflict for relationship functioning and performance. In an 
effort to explain this finding, we conducted post hoc interviews with managers in three 
importing firms. Managers perceived that efforts to discuss and resolve even not serious 
problems arising in relations with their foreign suppliers may not necessarily improve work 
processes but might hinder productivity and introduce delays that can harm performance. 
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However, due to the surprising nature of this finding, additional research is needed especially 
among importers to investigate the role of problem-solving conflict resolution in conditioning 
the functional conflict–performance link before firm conclusions can be drawn. 
Broadly, the presence of differences in exporter and importer perceptions with regard 
to some key study constructs may in part explain the surprising and inconsistent findings 
between the two groups. The existence of such differences between the trading partners are to 
a large extent justifiable because they are based in different market environments. They also 
are different firms with different objectives and priorities, and face dissimilar risks in their 
markets and operations. For instance, many import distributors may seek multiple foreign 
suppliers, product diversity, and supply flexibility. Thus, suppliers might be more vulnerable, 
be exposed to a certain level of uncertainty, and seek more stable, on-going relationships t  
reduce their risk exposure (Samiee & Walters, 2006). Thus, it is not surprising that suppliers 
in our sample were much more sensitive to conflict distortions compared to buyers. Further, 
the dependence structure in the dyad in terms of value received from and irreplaceability of 
the partner might be another source for explaining the different findings across the two 
groups (see Scheer, Mia, & Garrett, 2010). It would be enlightening if future research 
considers the role of dependence in influencing drivers and performance outcomes of 
functional and dysfunctional conflict in cross-border exchange relations. 
5.2 Managerial implications 
In essence, sound cross-border business exchanges are marked by high degree of joint 
planning and performance reviews, customized product exchanges, not-very-intense 
conflicting situations, and frequent communication (Paun, 1997), even though international 
buyer–seller relations are underpinned by psychic distance and the exercise of power and 
each party’s power base. Managers in exporting and importing firms should appreciate the 
non-productive role that use of punishments can play in relational exchanges as it is 
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conducive to enhancing dysfunctional conflict between the parties. Furthermore, international 
relationship managers, especially those in exporting companies, may find advantage in the 
use of rewards as an effective means of reducing such destructive conflict with their foreign 
trading counterparts. It is also evident from our findings that partnering firms in international 
exchange relationships can naturally live with tension and conflictual behavior. Therefore, 
managers in exporting and importing firms may need to learn how to deal and live with such 
conflict in the interactions with their overseas business partners. For importing companies, 
nonetheless, the presence of functional conflict is proven to be healthy for their performance 
and, thus, they may proactively pursue the engagement in constructive disagreements with 
their foreign supply counterpart.  
We also add to the literature on conflict in cross-border business exchanges by 
considering the role that power distance plays in potentially affecting the relationships of 
functional and dysfunctional conflict with performance. This research unveils that power 
distance boosts the negative performance effects of dysfunctional conflict in the relationship. 
The implication of this finding is that relationship managers in exporting and importing 
companies may find it prudent to empower employees and engage them in their firm’s 
interactions with their foreign trading partners as greater employee engagement seems to be 
instrumental in easing the negative performance consequences of dysfunctional conflict in the 
relationship. In addition, it is important that managers in both exporting and importing firms 
may usefully deploy a problem-solving conflict resolution approach to easing the adverse 
consequences of dysfunctional conflict for each partnering firm’s performance outcomes. 
Likewise, managers in exporting firms can also adopt productively this conflict resolution 
strategy in their efforts to boost the positive performance outcomes resulting from functional 




6. Limitations of the study and future research 
The findings should be interpreted in light of limitations associated with certain 
research design choices that we made in this study. First, our data collection took place at one 
point in time, which strictly prevents us from making causal inferences concerning the links 
investigated in the conceptual model. Ideally, testing cause-effects linkages among our model 
constructs requires the use of a longitudinal design that, although costly and time consuming 
to implement, can examine causality and more deeply investigate the complexity involved in 
sources of power and conflict phenomena in cross-border relationships.  
Second, this research was conducted in a particular international dyadic relationship 
context, namely, Slovene exporters and their foreign distributors. More research is needed in 
other cross-border buyer–seller relationship contexts to assess the generalizability of the 
present empirical findings. Unfortunately, due to pragmatic reasons pertaining to sample (and 
sub-group) size constraints, we do not have enough observations in each sub-group of 
importers (e.g., Austria, Serbia) to examine it along with its corresponding sub-group in the 
exporter sample in terms of assessing cross-cultural measure equivalence. This is an inherent 
limitation of our study, due in part to difficulties in collecting dyadic data in cross-border 
buyer-seller relationships that would enable meaningful cross cultural measure equivalence 
tests. This is particularly the case when the study is conducted among exporters from a 
relatively small country, and as such their foreign distributor partners are likely to be based in 
different countries. Thus, unless we consider import trading partners of Slovenian exporters 
across several countries, we would have been unable to put together a sizeable sample of 
importers (trading with corresponding export partners).  This point though is a relevant issue 
for exporter-importer relationship studies, thus we believe future research efforts should pay 
attention to the issue by investigating relationships of exporters from a specific country with 
their foreign distributor counterparts from another single country.  
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Third, we focused on a specific conflict resolution strategy and its impact on 
conditioning the performance implications of conflict between the parties. It may be 
enlightening if future investigation examines the relevance of other conflict resolution 
strategies (e.g., compromise, passive aggression) in potentially influencing the relationships 
of functional and dysfunctional conflict with performance outcomes. Further, we examine 
one aspect of culture, namely, power distance, in potentially conditioning the connections of 
different aspects of conflict with performance outcomes. Future research efforts may find 
advantage in considering other cultural dimensions (e.g., Hofstede, 2001) or the role of cross-
national distance aspects using objective measures (see Berry et al., 2010) in possibly 
influencing functional and dysfunctional conflict and how such distance may impact the 
performance outcomes of these different types of conflictual behavior.  
Finally, this study has focused on drivers and performance outcomes of functional and 
dysfunctional conflict in international buyer–seller dyadic relationships. Additional analysis 
identified the presence of some significant pair-wise differences in exportrs’ and importers’ 
perceptions, but revealed no significant effects of such perceptual differences in coercive and 
non-coercive power on functional and dysfunctional conflict and in different types of conflict 
on performance, respectively, due in part to sample size constraints and limited variability in 
perceptual gaps in our study. A natural extension of such dyadic cross-border relationship 
research is to the role of perceptual differences between the international exchange parties 
with emphasis on their importance in influencing perceptual gaps of other relational variables 
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APPENDIX 1: Measurement Scales 
 
Construct                
 
Non-coercive power      
(Five-point Likert scale, adapted from Katsikeas et al. [2000]) 
1. This foreign partner assesses our specific actions in a fair way. 
2. This foreign partner points out consequences of our actions not precisely considered by us. 
3. The information this foreign partner provides is logical and valuable. 
4. We trust this foreign partner’s judgment. 
5. The information provided by this foreign partner about this situation makes sense. a 
6.  We get good advice from this foreign partner. a 
 
Coercive power           
(Five-point Likert scale, adapted from Katsikeas et al. [2000] and Swasy [1979]) 
1. This foreign partner can harm us in some manner if we do not do as he/she suggests. 
2. If we do not do as this foreign partner suggests, he/she will punish us. 
3. Something bad will happen to us if we don’t do as this foreign partner requests and he/she finds out. 
 
Functional conflict  
(Five-point Likert scale, adapted from Song [2006]) 
1. We know each other better because of the way conflicts are handled. 
2. We are more sensitive to one another because of the way conflicts are handled.  
3. We feel energized and ready to get down to work after a conflict with the foreign partner.  
4. We see constructive changes occur on projects because of conflicts with the foreign partner.a 
 
Dysfunctional conflict              
(Five-point Likert scale, ranging from “not at all”, to “very much”, adapted from Rose et al. [2007]) 
1. To what extent is friction present in your relationship with this foreign parter? 
2. How much anger is present in your relationship with this foreign partner? 
3. To what extent are there personality clashes in your relationship with this foreign partner? 
4. To what extent are there emotional tensions in your relationship wit this foreign partner? 
 
Performance         
(Five-point scale, adapted from Katsikeas et al. [2009] and Zou et al. [1998]) 
Our performance through the relationship with this foreign partner… 
1. …has been very profitable. 
2. …has generated a high volume of sales. 
3. …has achieved rapid growth. 
4. …has significantly increased our market share. 
5. …has been very satisfactory. 
6. …has been very successful. a 
7. …has fully met our expectations. a 
 
Power distance      
(Five-point scale, adapted from Yoo & Donthu [2005]) 
Individuals in higher positions should … 
1. …make most decisions without consulting people in lower positions.  
2. …should not ask the opinions of people in lower positions too frequently. 
3. …avoid social interaction with people in lower positions.  
4. …not delegate important tasks to people in lower positions. 
5. …not disagree with decisions made by people in higher positions. 
 
Problem solving conflict resolution      
(Five-point scale, adapted from Koza & Dant [2007]) 
When handling conflict with this foreign partner, we… 
1. …lean toward a direct discussion of the problem with them. 
2. …try to show them the logic and benefits of our position. 
3. …communicate our priorities clearly. 
4. …attempt to get all our concerns and issues in the open. 
 







Figure 1: The research model 
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  IMPORTERS 
 
Measurement Model 1 
 
  Measurement Model 2  
 
Measurement Model 3  
 
Measurement Model 4 
Factor Standardized 
loadingsa 
 Factor Standardized  
loadingsa 
 Factor Standardized 
loadingsa 







Non-coercive power  
  
Performance 
   NCPW1 .85b     PERF1 .76 b     NCPW1 .52 b     PERF1 .56 b 
   NCPW2 .67 (7.09)     PERF2 .74 (7.63)     NCPW2 .58 (3.46)     PERF2 .78 (4.73) 
   NCPW3 .77 (8.32)     PERF3 .88 (8.95)     NCPW3 .62 (3.54)     PERF3 .73 (4.71) 
   NCPW4 .67 (6.76)     PERF4 .64 (6.48)     NCPW4 .57 (3.44)     PERF4 .54 (3.75) 
      PERF5 .78 (8.03)        PERF5 .61 (3.95) 
Coercive power     Coercive power     
   CPW1 .50 b  Problem-solving     CPW1 .69 b  Problem-solving 
   CPW2 .90 (4.72)     PS1 .64 b     CPW2 .96 (8.20)     PS1 .51 b 
   CPW3 .68 (4.54)     PS2 .52 (4.35)     CPW3 .84 (8.05)     PS2 .65 (2.39) 
      PS3 .91 (6.01)        PS3 .87 (2.38) 
Functional conflict     PS4 .69 (5.73)  Functional conflict     PS4 .61 (2.36) 
   FC1 .70 b        FC1 .52 b    
   FC2 .98 (5.99)  Power distance      FC2 .79 (3.59)  Power distance  
   FC3 .53 (5.34)     PD1 .64 b     FC3 .61 (3.88)     PD1 .59 b 
      PD2 .67 (5.10)        PD2 .64 (4.44) 
Dysfunctional conflict     PD3 .68 (5.68)  Dysfunctional conflict     PD3 .75 (4.70) 
   DFC1 .81 b     PD4 .64 (4.95)     DFC1 .60 b     PD4 .53 (3.94) 
   DFC2 .89 (10.24)     PD5 .59 (3.98)     DFC2 .79 (5.96)     PD5 .55 (4.02) 
   DFC3 .71 (7.65)        DFC3 .78 (5.90)    
   DFC4 .63 (5.56)        DFC4 .82 (6.06)    
           
Goodness-of-fit statistics 
2(71) = 113.91, p < .000 
 RMR = .05 
CFI = .93 
 IFI = .93 
RMSEA = .076 
 
 Goodness-of-fit statistics 
2(74) = 98.68, p < .000 
 RMR = .04 
CFI = .95 
 IFI = .95 
RMSEA = .057 
 Goodness-of-fit statistics 
2(71) = 90.02, p < .000 
 RMR = .04 
 CFI = .95 
 IFI = .96 
RMSEA = .052 
 Goodness-of-fit statistics 
2(74) = 82.94, p < .000 
 RMR = .05 
CFI = .97 
 IFI = .97 
RMSEA = .035 
a t-values from the unstandardized solution are in parentheses.  


































1.  Non-coercive Power 
 
1.00       
2.  Coercive Power  .07 1.00      
3.  Functional Conflict -.04 -.24 1.00     
4.  Dysfunctional Conflict -.35* .34* .18 1.00    
5.  Performance .40* -.04 .15 .03 1.00   
6.  Problem Solving .18 -.30* .34* -.08 .36* 1.00  














Cronbach’s Alpha .83 .71 .87 .85 .87 .77 .77 
Mean 3.85 1.68 3.43 1.69 3.64 4.01 2.19 
Standard Deviation 
 




       
 
1.  Non-coercive Power  
 
1.00       
2.  Coercive Power .08 1.00      
3.  Functional Conflict  -.04 -.03 1.00     
4.  Dysfunctional Conflict -.08 .34* -.21 1.00    
5.  Performance .06 .07 .21 .01 1.00   
6.  Problem Solving .01 -.18 .17 -.21 -.01 1.00  
7.  Power Distance 
 
.20* -.07 -.08 -.07 .03 .03 1.00 
Cronbach’s Alpha .67 .87 .67 .84 .70 .66 .73 
Mean 3.38 2.45 3.35 2.37 3.57 4.02 2.22 
Standard Deviation 
 
.56 .74 .59 .70 .47 .47 .73 





Table 3 Tests of hypothesized relationships 
    
(a) Dependent variable: Functional conflict     
    
    
 EXPORTERS  IMPORTERS 
Independent variables Coefficient t-value  Coefficient t-value 
      
Intercept 4.04 7.49*  3.54 8.74* 
Non-coercive power  -.04 -.28  -.04 -.37 
Coercive power  -.28 -2.48**  -.03 -.30 
      
 
R2 = .06 
Adjusted R2 = .04 
F-statistic = 3.18** 
 
R2 = .01 
Adjusted R2 = .01 
F-statistic = .12 
      
      
(b) Dependent variable: Dysfunctional conflict       
      
      
Intercept 2.62 7.56*  2.04 4.56* 
Non-coercive power  -.37 -4.39*  -.14 -1.20 
Coercive power  .31 4.23*  .33 3.66* 
      
 
R2 = .26 
Adjusted R2 = .24 
F-statistic = 17.41* 
 
R2 = .13 
Adjusted R2 = .11 
F-statistic = 7.11* 
      
    
(c) Dependent variable: Performance    
    
    
 EXPORTERS  IMPORTERS 
Independent variables Coefficient t-value  Coefficient t-value 
      
I.FIRST STEP (direct effects)      
Intercept 3.27 11.93*  2.90 8.45* 
Functional conflict  .11 1.49  .18 2.20** 
Dysfunctional conflict  .01 .01  .03 .52 
      
 
R2 = .02 
Adjusted R2 = .01 
F-statistic = 1.15 
 
R2 = .05 
Adjusted R2 = .03 
F-statistic = 2.41*** 
II. SECOND STEP (with interaction effects)    
Intercept 2.07 4.36*  3.17 5.81* 
Functional conflict  -.06 -.87  .22 2.70** 
Dysfunctional conflict  .07 .07  .03 .37 
Problem solving .45 4.23*  -.11 -1.02 
Power distance -.09 -.11  .01 .10 
Problem solving x functional conflict .31 2.79**  -.33 -2.08** 
Problem solving x dysfunctional conflict -.33 -2.22**  -.36 -2.05** 
Power distance x functional conflict .12 1.18  -.12 -.85 
Power distance x dysfunctional conflict -.46 -3.71*  -.11 -1.69*** 
    
 
R2 = .31* 
Adjusted R2 = .26 
F-statistic = 5.46* 
 
R2 = .16 
Adjusted R2 = .09 
F-statistic = 2.15** 
      
*p < .01, ** p < .05, *** p < .10. 
 
 
